ABSTRACT In this paper, we present improved meet-in-the-middle key-recovery attacks on six-round and seven-round Feistel constructions separately. The attacks are based on Guo et al.'s work which appends one round to the five-round distinguisher to attack the six-round Feistel construction through the meet-in-themiddle method. The proposed method stores only target sequences instead of all the possible sequences, which reduces the memory complexity from 2 (3/4)n blocks to 2 (n/2) blocks. A new key-recovery attack method on the seven-round Feistel construction is proposed by appending one another round after a five-round distinguisher. What is more, is that we propose a new method called the impossible-differential pairs sieve technique which reduces the data complexity from 2 n chosen plaintexts to 3 × 2 n−2 chosen plaintexts so that the attack complexity is lower than the exhaustive attack. The time complexity is equivalent to about 3 × 2 n−2 encryptions, and the memory complexity is optimized to 2 (3/4)n blocks of 2 (n/2) bits. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first known generic key-recovery attack on the seven-round Feistel construction with a lower attack complexity when compared with the exhaustive attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Feistel construction is a well-known and widely used construction proposed by Feistel [2] while designing Lucifer in 1973. Due to few restrictions on round functions and the similarity between encryption and decryption, this construction has attracted the attention of many researchers for decades. A lot of famous ciphers were produced based on Feistel construction, such as DES, Triple-DES, Camellia and CAST.
After the Feistel construction is widely applied, the security of this construction raised many researchers' interests. In SAC 2012, Sasaki et al. [3] proposed a kind of meet-in-themiddle distinguisher on Feistel construction. In SAC 2015, by utilizing recursion and greedy algorithm, Lin et al. [4] described an algorithm for searching the improved meetin-the-middle distinguisher based on Fouque et al. [5] and Matsui's [6] work. In CRYPTO 2015, Dinur et al. [7] proposed an improved meet-in-the-middle distinguisher, which improved the best attack results before. In CRYPTO 2016, Derbez et al. [8] presented an automatic meet-in-the-middle attack tool on Feistel construction.
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The best attacking result on Feistel construction with the attack complexity under exhaustive attack is proposed by Guo et al. In AsiaCrypt 2014, Guo et al. [1] constructed 5-round meet-in-the-middle distinguisher and recovery 6-round key of Feistel construction. The data complexity of this attack is 2 are in the table T ϕ which contains 2 n 2 guessed sequences. By this way, we can reduce the memory complexity from 2 3 4 n blocks to 2 n 2 blocks. As for 7-round attack, we find that for a fixed input difference X , the output difference of round function F 0 and F 6 can't take all 2 n 2 possible values. It can only take at most 2 n 2 −1 distinct values, which means some pairs can't be used for attacking. So we discard the pairs with an impossible difference in the right half of these plaintexts and ciphertexts. By using this pair sieve technique, we reduce the attack complexity such that this attack becomes valid. The data complexity of our 7-round generic key-recovery attack is 3 × 2 n−2 chosen plaintexts, the time complexity is 3 × 2 n−2 encryptions and the memory complexity is 2 3 4 n blocks (each block of 2 n 2 bits), which is the first known generic key-recovery attack on 7-round Feistel construction with the attack complexity under exhaustive key search attack.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. NOTATION AND DEFINITION
Throughout the paper, we will use the following notation. We use k to denote the key length, n denote the block size. We assume that the block size is equivalent to key length. Moreover, the Feistel is balanced, which means the branch size is n/2 bits and the key length is n bits. In the following, we define the Feistel Construction: 
{01} n/2 , the round function is F i : {01} n/2 → {01} n/2 , and round subkey is K i ∈ {01} n/2 . The transformation of the round i g i is defined as follows:
We assume that the round function F i is non-linear. Moreover, we assume that given a set of fixed input and output differences of F i , i.e.
I j , O j , j = 1, 2, · · · , on average there is one solution to each of the differential equations
We show following lemmas which will be used in the following context. We omit the network twist in the last round as it doesn't have the cryptographic significance. In the following context, we use X i,j and Y i,j to denote the input and output, X i,j and Y i,j denote the input difference and output difference for the j = (1, 2)th half of the ith round; the input and output of the round function F i is F I i and F O i , the input difference and output difference of the round function is
and Trunc n/2 is the truncation of the first n 2 bits. In other words, F (m, δ) gives the output difference of the left half of the pair of the ciphertexts, produced by encryption of a pair of plaintexts (m, m ⊕ (0, δ)) with 5 round Feistel.
Definition 3 (b − δ − Set, [7] ): A b − δ − set is a set of 2 b state values that are all different in b state bits (the active bits) and are all equal in the remaining state bits (the inactive bits).
B. LEMMAS AND PROPERTIES
Lemma 1 [1] : Let X and X , where X = X , be two non-zero half differences. If a 5-round Feistel encrypts a pair of plaintexts m, m with difference (0, X ) to a pair of ciphertexts with difference 0, X , then the number of possible internal state values of the three middle rounds F I 2 , F I 3 , F I 4 that correspond to the plaintexts m is limited to 2 n/2 on average. Lemma 2 [1] : Let m, m be a pair of plaintexts that conforms to the 5-round differential characteristic given in Figure 2 and let (b > 1). Actually, Lemma 2 provides a 5-round distinguisher to recover 6-round Feistel construction.
Property 1: For arbitrary nonlinear function f (x) on F n 2 → F n 2 and a fixed nonzero value A ∈ F n 2 , f (x)⊕f (x ⊕ A) can assume at most 2 n−1 possible values.
Proof 1: 
III. IMPROVED MEET IN THE MIDDLE ATTACKS ON FEISTEL CONSTRUCTION
A. 6-ROUND KEY-RECOVERY ATTACK GIVEN BY GUO et al. [1] : According to Lemma 2, we get a 5-round distinguisher shown in Figure 3 . In order to attack 6-round Feistel, Guo et al. [1] prepend one round to the 5-round distinguisher and the attack model is illustrated in Figure 4 . The attack consists of precomputation and online phases. The online phase is further divided into collecting pair and key-recovery phases. In the precomputation phase, to achieve a time/memory tradeoff, they choose 2 n 4 distinct truncated differential X , which leads to 2 n 4 distinct pairs X , X . And for each pair, find all possible 2 n/2 sequences of F m, δ j based on Lemma 2. They store all 2 3 4 n sequences in a large table T δ . Besides this, they construct another table T 0 to obtain F I 0 more efficiently. Next, in the online phase, they construct 2 n 4 plaintext structures, each plaintext structure consists of 2 n 2 +1 plaintexts and yields to 2 n pairs plaintexts whose input difference is (X , * ). * denotes an arbitrary non-zero n 2 bits value. They choose those pairs whose output difference equals to one of the 2 n 4 0, X , which holds with the probability 2 
6-Round Key-Recovery Attack
So we have the output difference of the right half is δ j . Since the input of round function F 0 corresponding to m is F I 0 , then that corresponding to m δ j is
By theorem 1, we show that if can get F I 0 (the input value of round function F 0 corresponding to m), we are able to construct the plaintext sequence. We notice that for each candidate plaintext m, there exists a pair of plaintext m, m whose left half of the input differences is fixed with X and right half of the input differences is known to the attacker. So we can obtain the value of F I 0 corresponding to m by solving the differential equation
, m 2 denotes the right half of the input difference of m, m . To solve these equations more efficient, we store
We use Algorithm 2 to construct table T 0 .In the following context, we will present the attack procedure in detail.
2) PRECOMPUTATION
This phase is divided into two parts: the data collecting phase and the sequences constructing phase. In the data collecting phase, we choose 2 n 4 distinct plaintext structures, each plaintext structure contains 2 n 2 +1 plaintexts and yields to 2 n pairs satisfy the input truncated differential of the left half is X . As for output difference, the truncated differential of the left half is 0 and that of the right half is X . To make a time/data/memory tradeoff, we relax the constraint of a fixed X and allow 2 Query (m 1 , m 2 ) and store it in L 0 sorted by the ciphertext value; 6: Query (m 1 ⊕ X , m 2 ) and store it in L 1 sorted by the ciphertext value; 7: Pick up the elements of L 0 × L 1 whose ciphertext match in the 3 4 n most significant bits.
After we construct the plaintext sequences of each of 2 n 2 candidate plaintexts, we get 2 n 2 plaintext sequences. Then encrypt them and store all 2 n 2 F m, δ j sequences (the guessed sequences ) in table T ϕ . The procedure of constructing the guessed sequences is described in Algorithm 3.
Then it comes to the sequences constructing phase. We are going to construct 2 n 2 guessed sequences. For each pair we obtained in the former phase, we construct a plaintext sequence that the input difference of plaintexts is δ j , 0 j , and after one round encryption, the difference become 0, δ j ,δ j = 1, · · · , 2 b − 1. Since δ j is given by the attacker, upon we get the values of 0 j corresponding to δ j , we are able to construct the sequence. Tables T 0 and T 2 1: 
Algorithm 2 Construction of the
6:
Compute F m, δ j Tables T 3   1 :
Algorithm 4 Construction of the
Store (i, F 3 (i)) in a temporal table T tmp
for each of 2 n 4 distinct X do 5: Lookup T tmp to obtain j such that F 3 (j)
Store X , i, i ⊕ j in table T 3 7: Sort the elements in T 3 in order of X << n 2 ⊕ (i ⊕ j) by using quick-sort algorithm.
3) ONLINE PHASE
We construct some tables which will be used in online phase. From the proof of lemma 1 [1] , we can find that if the plaintexts pair satisfies the differential characteristic (X , * )
− −−−− → 0, X , the differentials of round function F 2 , F 3 and F 4 are X → , → X ⊕ X and X → respectively. In other words, the input differences of F 2 and F 4 are fixed with X and X respectively. The output difference of F 3 is fixed with X ⊕ X . From the proof of lemma 2 [1] , to compute all 2 3 4 n possible sequences (the target sequences), we have to compute the values of F I 2 , F I 3 and F I 4 . We can get the values by solving the differential equations
To solve these equations more efficient, we tabulate T 2 , T 3 and T 4 by using the Algorithm 1, Algorithm 4 and Algorithm 5. After build T 2 , T 3 and T 4 , we use Algorithm 6 to obtain 2 3 4 n target sequences. Tables T 4 and T 6 1:
Algorithm 5 Construction of the
for each of 2 
Compute
Check whether there is a match between
We should emphasize that we don't store the 2 3 4 n target sequences, once we obtain a sequence, we check it whether we can find a match in table T ϕ . If there exists a match, that means the assumption the corresponding candidate plaintext pairs which are satisfied the differential characteristic (X , * )
And the corresponding F I 0 we used in the precomputation phase while constructing the guessed sequence is correct with high probability. Then we can recover K 0 by let K 0 = F I 0 ⊕ m 1 . Otherwise we drop the candidate and going to check the next candidate sequence.
4) COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
In the precomputation phase, we choose 2 n 4 plaintext structures, each plaintext structure contains 2 n 2 +1 plaintexts. So the data complexity of this attack is 2 3 4 n chosen plaintexts. Meanwhile, we have to encrypt these plaintexts, the time complexity of this phase is 2 3 4 n encryptions. In the online phase, we need lookup to the table T ϕ for 2 3 4 n times. Since the time complexity of lookup operation is related to the size of the table and T ϕ has 2 n 2 sequence. The time expenditure of online phase is about n × 2 3 4 n times comparison operations (each lookup to the table T ϕ takes about n ≈ log 2 2 n 2 times comparison operations). Since encryption once take far more time than n times comparison operations, we omit the time expenditure of the online phase. As for memory costs of our attack, since Guo et al. count the complexity as blocks, each is 2 n 2 bits. To compare with Guo et al.'s work more convenient, we use blocks to count the memory complexity as theirs work. Since we don't store all 2 3 4 n target sequences, we only store 2 n 2 guessed sequences, the memory complexity is 2 n 2 blocks, each block is 2 b × 2 n 2 bits. On the one hand, if b is too large, it cost more space to construct table T ϕ . On the other hand, if b is too small, many candidates will pass the distinguisher wrongly. Thus, we should select an optimal value of b. A wrong candidate will pass the distinguisher with the probability 2 3n/4 /2 n2 b /2 = 2 n 3−2 b+1 /4 . We want 3 − 2 b+1 < 0 so that the number of wrong candidate passes the distinguisher is less than 1. We have b > 1 and let b = 2. Thus, the memory complexity is 2 b * 2
blocks, each block is about 2 n 2 bits, we omit the factor 4 since it is far less than 2 n 2 . So, the memory complexity is 2 n 2 blocks, each block is about 2 n 2 bits. To conclude, the data complexity of our attack is 2 Guo et al. prepend one round to the 5-round distinguisher to attack 6-round Feistel, we found that we can add another round at the end of the 5-round distinguisher, besides this, by using a method called impossible-differential pairs sieve technique, we could attack 7-round Feistel. The attack model is illustrated in Figure 5 . As shown in Figure 5 , we use the 7-round differential characteristic (X , * )
− −−−− → X , * , * denotes an arbitrary non-zero n 2 bits value. What's more, from property 1, we find that for a fixed input difference X , the output difference of round function F 0 can't take all 2 n 2 possible values. It can only take at most 2 n 2 −1 distinct values, which means some pairs can't be used for attacking. So we discard the pairs with an impossible difference in the right half of these plaintexts and call this method as impossible-differential pairs sieve technique. Similarly, we can discard the pairs with an impossible difference in the right half of these ciphertexts, as round function F 6 can't take all 2 n 2 possible values for each fixed input difference X . Similar to Guo et al.'s 6-round attack, our attack divided into two phases: precomputation phase and online phase.
In the precomputation phase, besides construct T 0 and store all the 2 3 4 n possible F m, δ j sequences in table T δ , we tabulate other three tables: T 6 , T 0 * and T 6 * . We construct T 6 to solve the differential equation = c 2 more efficiently. Besides these, we construct table T 0 * and T 6 * to record whether the output difference is possible or not for fixed input difference X of F 0 and X of F 6 . The online phase is divided into collecting pairs and key-recovery phases. In collecting pairs phase, after construct plaintext structures, we check whether the left half of the ciphertexts difference is X . Then, we check whether the right half of the plaintext difference in table T 0 * and the right half of the ciphertexts difference in table T 6 * (we call it pairs sieve), such that remained pairs satisfy the differential characteristics (X , * ) → X , * and can be used for the following attacking.
It is worth to point out that the key of our attack is valid attribute to the pairs sieve technique. Since we choose 2 and yields to 2 n pairs plaintexts, we have 2 5n 4 pairs satisfy the input difference. And similar to our 6-round attack, to make a time/data/memory tradeoff, we relaxing the restrict of the values of a fixed X and allow 2 
Doing what algorithm 6 step 5 to step 8 did 6: Store F (m, 1) , F (m, 2) , F (m, 3) in table T δ as the key length is n. In that case, we use pairs sieve technique, since for a fixed input difference X , the output difference of round function F 0 can assume at most 2 n/2 −1 distinct values. Thus, for a plaintext pair whose right half of the input difference is an arbitrary non-zero number in F n/2 2 , we can find a match in table T 0 * with probability no more than 1/2 , which is same to the round function F 6 . So, after the plaintext pairs sieve procedure, the number of left plaintext pairs is no more than 2 n−2 . Moreover, by select b = 2, our attack becomes valid. For each pair that pass the filter, we assume that it satisfies the differential characteristics (X , * )
So that we could get the input and output difference of round function F 0 ,F 6 under the assumptions. Thus, we can get two differential equations:
. m 2 and c 2 denote the right half of plaintext pairs and ciphertext pairs, respectively. By lookup the table T 0 and T 6 , we can get the corresponding value F I 0 , F I 6 . Hence, we can obtain a candidate of the subkeys (K 0 , K 6 ) for each candidate pairs. Then, for each 2 n−2 remained m, we use F I 0 to build a b − δ − set at the plaintext position and F I 6 to partial decrypt the cipher to check whether the F m, δ j sequences are in the precomputation table. If the sequence is included in the precomputation table T δ , (K 0 , K 6 ) is a correct guess with high probability, otherwise it is wrong. The details of our attack is describe as follows:
2) PRECOMPUTATION
This phase is similar to Guo et al.'s 6-round attack [1] in precomputation phase. We repeat what they did in precomputation phase. We construct T 0 by using Algorithm 1 and construct all 2 3 4 n possible sequences F (m, 1) , F (m, 2) , F (m, 3) (we select the parameter b = 2, so the length of each sequence is 2 2 − 1 = 3) and store it in table T δ by using Algorithm 7. The only difference between ours and theirs is that we make other three tables: T 6 , T 0 * and T 6 * . We construct table T 6 by using Algorithm 5 and T 0 * ,T 6 * by using Algorithm 8.
3) ONLINE PHASE
Similar to Guo et al.'s 6-round attack, the online phase divide into two parts: collecting pairs and recovery of keys. 
